Most cryptographic primitives require randomness (for example, to generate their secret keys). Usually, one assumes that perfect randomness is available, but, conceivably, such primitives might be built under weaker, more realistic assumptions. This is known to be true for many authentication applications, when entropy alone is typically sufficient. In contrast, all known techniques for achieving privacy seem to fundamentally require (nearly) perfect randomness. We ask the question whether this is just a coincidence, or, perhaps, privacy inherently requires true randomness?
Introduction
Randomness is important in many areas of computer science. It is especially indispensable in cryptography: secret keys must be random, and many cryptographic tasks, such as public-key encryption, secret sharing or commitment, require randomness for every use. Typically, one assumes that all parties have access to a perfect random source, but this assumption is at least debatable, and the question of what kind of imperfect random sources can be used for various applications has attracted a lot of attention.
Extraction. The easiest such class of sources consists of extractable sources for which one can deterministically extract nearly perfect randomness, and then use it in any application. Although various examples of such non-trivial sources are known (see [TV00, KRVZ06] and the references therein), most natural sources, such as the so called entropy sources 1 [SV86, CG88, Zuc96] , are easily seen to be non-extractable. One can then ask the natural question of whether perfect randomness is indeed inherent for the considered application, or perhaps one can do with weaker, more realistic assumptions. Clearly, the answer depends on the application.
well the the entire theory of pseudorandomness, crucially use a random seed to obtain the desired constructions. Second, attempts to build secure encryption schemes (and other privacy primitives) based on known "non-extractable" sources, such as various entropy sources, provably failed, indicating that such sources are indeed insufficient for privacy. For example, McInnes and Pinkas [MP90] showed that unconditionally secure symmetric encryption cannot be based on entropy sources, even if one is restricted to encrypting a single bit. This result was subsequently strengthened by Dodis et al. [DOPS04] , who showed that entropy sources are not sufficient even for computationally secure encryption (as well as essentially any other task involving "privacy", such as commitment, zero-knowledge and others).
The only reassuring result in the other direction is the work of Dodis and Spencer [DS02] , who considered the setting of symmetric encryption, where the shared secret key comes from an imperfect random source, instead of being truly random. In this setting, they constructed a particular non-extractable imperfect source, nevertheless allowing one to perfectly encrypt a single bit. By itself, this result is not surprising. For example, a uniform distribution on {0, 1, 2} allows one to encrypt a bit (by addition modulo 3), but not to extract a bit, which is obvious. Indeed, the actual contribution of [DS02] was not to show that the separation between one bit encryption and extraction exists -as we just saw, this is trivial -but to show that a very strong separation still holds even if one additionally requires all the distributions in the imperfect source to have high entropy (in fact, very close to n). In practice, however, we typically care about encrypting considerably more than a single bit. In such cases, it is certainly unreasonable to expect that, say, encryption of b bits will necessarily imply extraction of exactly b bits (which was indeed disproved by [DS02] for b = 1). One would actually expect that an implication, if true, would lose at least a few bits (perhaps depending on the statistical distance ε from the uniform distribution that we want our extraction to achieve).
In particular, the results of [DS02] leave open the following extreme possibilities: (a) perhaps any source encrypting already two bits must be extractable; or (b) perhaps there exists an n-bit source allowing one to perfectly encrypt almost n bits, and yet not to extract even a single bit. Clearly, possibility (a) would strongly indicate that true randomness is inherent for encryption, while possibility (b) that it is not. As we will see shortly, both (a) and (b) happen to be false, but our point is that the results of [DS02] Our Result. We resolve the above question. Our main result shows that if an n-bit source S allows for a secure (and even slightly biased) encryption of b bits, where b > log n, then one can deterministically extract almost b nearly perfect random bits from S ; see Theorem 1(a) for the precise bound. Moreover, the restriction that b > log n is essentially tight: there exist imperfect sources allowing one to perfectly encrypt b ≈ log n − loglog n bits, from which one cannot deterministically extract even a single slightly unbiased (let alone random!) bit; see Theorem 1(b). 2 Hence, to a large extent, true randomness is inherent for (information-theoretic) private-key encryption:
Either the key length n must be exponential in the message length b, or One can deterministically extract almost b nearly random bits from the key.
In particular, in the case when b is large enough, so that it is infeasible to sample more than 2 b (imperfect) bits for one's secret key, our result implies the following. In order to build a secure b-bit encryption scheme, one must come up with a source of randomness from which one can already deterministically extract almost b nearly random bits! Notice, since such extracted bits can then be used as a one-time pad, we get that any b-bit encryption scheme can in principle be converted to a "one-time-pad-like" scheme capable of encrypting nearly b bits! In this sense, our results show that, for the purpose of information-theoretically encrypting a "non-trivial" number of bits, the one-time pad scheme is essentially "universal".
Extensions. Our result can be extended in several ways.
First, the basic extractor we construct is inefficient, even if the encryption scheme is efficient (i.e., runs in time polynomial in n). However, using the technique of Trevisan and Vadhan [TV00] (see also [DSS01, Dod00] ), we can obtain the following marginally weaker result which maintains efficiency: if a source S enables an efficient encryption of b > log n bits, then there exists an efficient deterministic extractor allowing one to extract roughly (b − log n) nearly perfect bits from S . Despite the small loss of log n bits, we still get the same pessimistic conclusion: unless the key is exponential in the message length, efficient encryption implies efficient extraction of nearly the same number of bits.
Second, our technique extends to computationally secure privacy primitives which are perfectly (or statistically) binding, which includes perfectly-binding commitment (which, therefore, must be computationally hiding) and computationally secure private-or public-key encryption. Specifically, let λ be the security parameter, n = poly(λ) be the number of random bits coming from the imperfect source S , and assume that S is good enough to efficiently (i.e., in time polynomial in λ) implement the required computationally secure (but perfectly-binding) primitive on b = ω(log λ) bits. Then we show that there exists an efficient extractor capable of extracting b(1 − o(1)) pseudorandom bits from S . Of course, at this point one can also apply a pseudorandom generator, whose existence is typically implied by the existence of the corresponding computational primitive, to stretch the extracted (pseudo)randomness further by any polynomial amount. Also, since every individual pseudorandom bit must actually be statistically random (otherwise, the distinguisher succeeds by simply outputting this bit), we still get that any of the above computationally secure primitives on b = ω(log λ) bits requires at least some nearly perfect randomness.
To summarize, non-trivial computationally secure primitives which are perfectly binding require some efficiently extractable true randomness.
Organization. We define the needed notation in Section 2, which also allows us to formally state our main result (Theorem 1). In Section 3 we prove that encryption of b > log n bits using an n-bit key implies extraction of roughly b random bits, and mention the "computational" extensions of this result. In Section 4, which is the main technical section, we show that encryption of up to (log n − loglog n) bits does not necessarily imply extraction of even a single bit. Finally, in Section 5 we conclude and state some open problems.
Notation and Definitions
We use calligraphic letters, like X , to denote finite sets. The corresponding large letter X is then used to denote a random variable over X , while the lowercase letter x denotes a particular element from X . U X denotes the uniform distribution over X . A source S over X is a set of distributions over X . We write X ∈ S to state that S contains a distribution X.
The statistical distance SD(X 1 , X 2 ) between two random variables X 1 , X 2 is
If SD(X 1 , X 2 ) ≤ ε, this means that no (even computationally unbounded) distinguisher D can tell apart a sample from X 1 from a sample from X 2 with an advantage greater than ε.
If such Ext exists for S , we say that S is (R, ε)-extractable. ♦ Definition 2 An encryption scheme E over message space M, key space K and ciphertext space C is a pair of algorithms Enc : K × M → C and Dec : K × C → M, which for all keys k ∈ K and messages m ∈ M satisfies Dec(k, Enc(k, m)) = m. Given a source S over K, we say that the encryption scheme E is (S , δ)-secure if for all messages m 1 , m 2 ∈ M and all distributions K ∈ S we have
If S admits some (S , δ)-secure encryption E over M, we say that S is (M, δ)-encryptable. When δ = 0, we say that E is perfect on S , and S is perfectly encryptable (on M). ♦ Throughout we will use the following capital letters to denote the cardinalities of various sets: key set cardinality |K| = N , message set cardinality |M| = B, ciphertext set cardinality |C| = S, and extraction space cardinality |R| = L. Although our results are general, for historical reasons it is customary to translate the results into "bit-notation". To accommodate these conventions, we let b = log B, ℓ = log L, n = log N (here and elsewhere, all the logarithms are base 2), and will use the terms "b-bit encryption", "ℓ-bit extraction" or "n-bit key" with the obvious meanings attached. Moreover, we will slightly abuse the terminology and say that a source S is (1) n-bit if it is over a set K and |K| = N ; (2) (ℓ, ε)-extractable if it is (R, ε)-extractable and |R| = L, and (2) (b, δ)-encryptable if it is (M, δ)-encryptable and |M| = B. Clearly, when b, ℓ or n are integers, this terminology is consistent with our intuitive understanding.
With this in mind, our main result can be restated as follows: 
Thus, even perfect encryption of nearly log n bits does not imply extraction of even a single slightly unbiased bit. 3 The formula also holds for b = log n − loglog n − 1, but yields a slightly smaller ε = 
Encryption ⇒ Extraction if b > log n
In this section we prove the implication given in Theorem 1(a), which shows that encryption of b bits implies extraction of nearly b bits. Assume E = (Enc, Dec) is (S , δ)-secure over message space M, ciphertext space C and key space K. For convenience, let us identify the message space M with {1, . . . , B}. Also, let ℓ (to be specified later) denote the number of bits we wish to extract, L = 2 ℓ , and R be an arbitrary set of cardinality L.
We start constructing the needed extractor Ext : K → R by showing that it is sufficient to construct a good extractor Ext ′ : C → R for an auxiliary source S ′ , defined by
Ext ′ is the assumed extractor for S ′ , then the following extractor Ext is the claimed extractor for S :
Proof: Take any distribution K ∈ S , and let
Then, using definition of Ext in Equation (5), we have
The first inequality follows from the triangle inequality on statistical distance. The second -from the δ-security of the encryption (stating that encryption of 1 is δ-close to the encryption of a random message U M ) and the convexity of statistical distance (when expanding K as the convex combination of "point" distributions). Finally, the last inequality follows from the fact that Ext ′ is an ε-fair extractor for S ′ .
The point of this reduction (which is the only place in our argument using the δ-security of E) is to reduce the task of constructing an extractor for our (potentially infinite) source S to an extractor for
contains b bits of entropy. Indeed, for any k ∈ K and m 1 = m 2 , we have Enc(k, m 1 ) = Enc(k, m 2 ), since otherwise one would not be able to recover the message from the ciphertext. 4 Thus, each D k is a uniform distribution on some B-element subset of the ciphertext space C: we call such distributions b-flat. It turns out that this is the only thing we need to know to ensure the existence of a good extractor for S ′ ! Lemma 2 Assume S ′ = {D k | k ∈ K} is any collection of b-flat distributions of cardinality N over some space C, where b > loglog N + 2 log
We show that a completely random function f : C → R gives a required deterministic extractor Ext ′ with non-zero (in fact, overwhelming!) probability, implying that the claimed Ext ′ exists. Take any fixed k ∈ K and any fixed subset T ⊆ R. Let p def = |T |/|R| be the density of T . For any fixed f , define the quantity
and let us estimate Pr 
, and applying the standard additive Chernoff bound toX, we get
We now take a union bound over all T ⊆ R and all k ∈ K. Recalling definition of ∆ f (k, T ) (Equation (6)), using b > loglog N + 2 log 1 ε (so N < 2 ε 2 B ) and
for all subsets T and keys k. Using the definition of statistical distance (Equation (2)), this means that
The first assertion of Theorem 1(a) follows immediately by combining Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. In the following subsections we mention the extensions to efficient extraction and other computational primitives which are perfectly-binding.
Efficient Encryption Implies Efficient Extraction
Using Lemma 1 (and, in particular, Equation (5)), we see that when the encryption algorithm Enc is efficient (i.e., runs in time polynomial in n), to construct an efficient extractor Ext for S it suffices to construct an efficient extractor Ext ′ for the source S ′ consisting of N efficiently samplable b-flat distributions D k = Enc(k, U M ), where k ∈ K. Unfortunately, the extractor Ext ′ that we built for S ′ via Lemma 2 was generally inefficient. Luckily, we can build an efficient extractor for S ′ using the technique of Trevisan and Vadhan [TV00] , which was later explored in more detail by [Dod00] .
The idea is to sample the function f (which will define Ext ′ ) at random from any family F t of t-wise independent functions from C to R. Recall, such families have the property that for any distinct c 1 . . . c t ∈ C, the values f (c 1 ) . . . f (c t ) are random and independent from each other, if f is chosen at random from F t . Also, one can construct t-wise independent function families where each f can be evaluated in time polynomial in t and s, where s is the length of an element of C. Since the encryption scheme is efficient, s is polynomial in n. Thus, as long as t is polynomial in n, every member f ∈ F t will be efficiently computable. As was shown by [TV00, Dod00], setting t = O(n) is already enough: the following Lemma (essentially from [Dod00] ) is proven for self-containment and because it uses a slightly different parameter setting.
Lemma 3 ([Dod00]) Assume ℓ ≤ b−log n−2 log 1 ε −2, and f is chosen at random from a family of 2n-wise independent functions from C to R, where |R| = L = 2 ℓ . Then for any collection
Proof: The first attempt to prove this result would be to use the same proof template as in Lemma 2. Namely, to prove that for any subset T ⊆ R and any
is unlikely to be different from its expectation Pr[U R ∈ T ] by more then ε. Unfortunately, with "only" a t-wise independent function f , the tail bound we would get for this undesirable event is not strong enough to take the union bound over all subsets T (unless t is exponential in b, which was the case when a truly random f was chosen in Lemma 2). Instead, we will only consider "singleton" sets T = {r}, for r ∈ R, but will prove a stronger bound on ∆ f (k, {r})
This stronger bound will enable us to use Equation (1) (rather than Equation (2)) when bounding the statistical distance, and then take a union bound over "only" L singleton sets {r} instead of 2 L subsets T . Details follow.
We fix any k ∈ K, r ∈ R, and estimate Pr
We do it similarly to Lemma 2. Assume D k is a uniform distribution over some set {c 1 , . . . , c B } ⊆ C, and let X m denote an indicator random variable which is 1 if and only if f (c m ) = r. Since f is 2n-wise independent, so are the variables {X m }: any 2n of them are random and independent from each other. Let
Next, we use the tail bound for the sum X of t-wise independent random variables from [Dod00] (Theorem 5, page 48). It says that if t ≥ 8 is an even integer and ε <
In our case, t = 2n, E[X] = B L , and we get by Equation (7)
where the last inequality used ℓ ≤ b − 2 log 1 ε − log n − 2. Taking now the union bound over all k ∈ K and r ∈ R, we get that with probability at least (1 − 2 −n ) over the choice of f , we have |∆ f (k, {r})| ≤ 2ε L for all k ∈ K and r ∈ R. In other words, for any k ∈ K, f (D k ) hits every element r ∈ R with probability between (1 ± 2ε)/L. Using the definition of statistical distance in Equation (1), this implies that with probability at least (1 − 2 −n ) over the choice of f , SD(f (D k ), U R ) ≤ ε for all k ∈ K, which completes the proof.
The above lemma immediately gives a constructive probabilistic method for showing the existence of an efficient deterministic extractor claimed by the second part of Theorem 1(a). Namely, combining Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 we get a concrete family of efficient functions most of which are guaranteed to be good deterministic extractors for S . However, to actually fix a concrete extractor, one must either directly look at the source S in question, or choose the extractor obliviously by sampling it (using good randomness) from our family once and for all, or rely on non-uniformity. Alternatively, in case the length s of the ciphertext c is only slightly larger than the length b of the plaintext m, we can use an explicit deterministic extractor of Trevisan and Vadhan [TV00] for the efficiently samplable source S ′ . Assuming some strong complexity assumptions (see [TV00] ), this would give us an explicit way to deterministically extract Ω(b) bits, provided s < (1 + γ)b for a small enough constant γ.
Other Perfectly-Binding Computational Primitives
We now extend our results above to handle computationally secure privacy primitives which are perfectly binding, which includes perfectly-binding commitment (which, therefore, must be computationally hiding) and computationally secure private-or public-key encryption.
Let λ be the security parameter, n = poly(λ) be the number of random bits coming from the imperfect source S , and assume that S is good enough to efficiently (i.e., in time polynomial in λ) implement the required computationally secure (but perfectly-binding) primitive P on b = ω(log λ) bits. Trying to unify all the above examples into one template, this means that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm Enc, which takes input m ∈ M and "randomness" k ∈ K, and outputs a perfectly-binding "commitment" c to m. Here k denotes all the randomness needed to evaluate Enc once. For example, for secret-or publickey encryption, k includes the randomness used to sample the secret and/or public key, and, if required, the local randomness used to encrypt the message. On the other hand, for commitment, k includes the randomness used to set-up the global commitment parameters, as well as the randomness used to commit to the messages.
We assume that c is perfectly-binding in the following sense: for any randomness k and any m 1 = m 2 , we have Enc(k, m 1 ) = Enc(k, m 2 ). Notice, we do not require any efficient "decryption" algorithm recovering m from c and k (which we have in the case of encryption, but not commitment). Clearly, this includes the perfectly-binding encryption and commitment applications above. In fact, it even includes some primitives which are traditionally not considered perfectly-binding. For example, Pedersen's commitment [Ped91] computes Enc((r, g, h, p), m) = g r h m mod p, where k = (r, g, h, p) includes a prime p, two generators g and h of some large-enough subgroup G of Z * p of prime order q, and local randomness r ∈ Z q used to mask the message m ∈ Z q . Traditionally, this commitment scheme is considered perfectly-hiding (in the setting of ideal randomness), since for any m, the value Enc((r, . . .), m) is uniformly distributed for a random r. However, it is perfectly-binding according to our definition, since for any fixed value of r, the value of m is (inefficiently but) uniquely determined given c (and g, h, p). Thus, our notion of perfect binding is a weaker restriction than what might originally appear.
Also, in terms of computational security of P w.r.t. a source of randomness S , we require that for any distribution K ∈ S and any m ∈ M, no efficient attacker A can distinguish Enc(K, m) from Enc(K, U M ) with non-negligible probability (in λ). Finally, we say that an efficient algorithm Ext extracts ℓ pseudorandom bits from some source S , if for any K ∈ S and any efficient attacker A, A has at most a negligible in λ chance of telling apart a sample of Ext(K) from a sample of U ℓ . Needless to say, any ε-fair "statistical" extractor satisfies this definition as long as ε is negligible in λ.
With these clarifications in mind, we can generalize Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 as follows. Lemma 1 trivially extends to show that if some efficient Ext ′ extracts b ′ pseudorandom bits from the source , 1) ) also extracts b ′ pseudorandom bits from S . This is the only place using the computational security of P , the rest of the proofs stays information-theoretic. As for Lemma 3, it stays the same, but we use it with any value ε which is negligible in λ, but still such that log 1 ε = o(b). This is possible since we assumed that b = ω(log λ). Then Lemma 3 implies the existence of an efficient extractor Ext ′ for S ′ (since n = poly(λ), so that one can efficiently evaluate a 2n-wise independent function) which extracts b − 2 log (1)) bits of negligible statistical distance ε from the uniform distribution, implying that these b(1 − o(1)) bits are also pseudorandom.
To summarize, for any perfectly-binding primitive P on b = ω(log λ) bits, we get the possibility of efficiently extracting b(1 − o(1)) pseudorandom bits.
Encryption ⇒ Extraction if b < log n − loglog n
In this section we prove the non-implication given in Theorem 1(b), which shows that even perfect encryption of up to (log n − loglog n) bits does not necessarily imply extraction of even a single bit. For that we need to define a specific b-bit encryption scheme E = (Enc, Dec) and a source S , such that S is perfect on E, but "non-extractable". The proof will proceed in several stages.
Defining Good Encryption E
As the first observation, we claim that we only need to define the encryption scheme E, and then let the source S = S (E) be the set of all key distributions K making E perfect:
Indeed, S (E) is the largest source which is (b, 0)-encryptable by means of E, so it is the hardest one to extract even a single bit from. We call distributions in S (E) perfect (for E).
Although we are not required to do so, let us intuitively motivate our choice of E before actually defining it. For that it is very helpful to view our key space K in terms of the encryption scheme E as follows. Given any E = (Enc, Dec), we identify each key k ∈ K with an ordered B-tuple of ciphertexts (c 1 , . . . , c B ), where Enc(k, m) = c m . Notice, some B-tuples might not correspond to valid keys. For example, this is the case when c i = c j for some i = j, since then encryptions of i and j are the same under this key. Intuitively, however, the larger is the set of valid B-tuples of ciphertexts, the more variety we have in the set of perfect distributions S (E), and the harder it would be to extract from S (E). This suggests that every B-tuple (c 1 , . . . , c B ) of ciphertexts should correspond to a potential key, except for the necessary constraint that all the c m 's must be distinct to enable unique decryption.
A bit more formally, we assume that N can be written as N = S(S − 1) . . . (S − B + 1) for some integer S. 5 Then we define the set C = {1, . . . S} to be the set of ciphertexts, M = {1, . . . , B} be the set of plaintexts, and view the key set K as the set of distinct B-tuples over C:
We then define Enc ((c 1 . . . c B ) , m) = c m , while Dec ((c 1 , . . . , c B ) , c) to be the (necessarily unique) m such that c m = c, and arbitrarily if no such m exists. Notice, N < S B , so that S > N 1/B , which is strictly greater than B when b < log n − loglog n. Thus, S contains enough ciphertexts to allow for B distinct encryptions.
Excluding 0-monochromatic Distributions
Let us now take an arbitrary bit extractor Ext : K → {0, 1} and argue that it is not very good on the set of perfect distributions S (E). We say that a distribution K is 0-monochromatic if Pr[Ext(K) = 0] = 1. Clearly, if the set of perfect distributions S (E) contains a 0-monochromatic distribution K, then SD(Ext(K), U 1 ) = 1 2 (here and below, U 1 is the uniform distribution of {0, 1}), and we would be done. Thus, for the remainder of the proof we assume that S (E) does not contain a 0-monochromatic distribution. The heart of the proof then will consist of designing a perfect encryption distribution K such that
Once this is done, recalling that S > N 1/B = 2 n/2 b we immediately get
as claimed by Theorem 1(b). Thus, we concentrate on building a perfect distribution K satisfying Equation (8). For that, in the following subsections we will (1) characterize perfect distributions using linear algebra; (2) use this characterization to understand the implication of the lack of 0-monochromatic perfect distributions; and, finally, (3) use this implication to construct the required perfect distribution K.
Characterizing Perfect Distributions
Let K be any distribution on K. Given a key k = (c 1 .
] and p be the N -dimensional column vector whose k-th component is equal to p k . Notice, being a probability vector, we know that p k = 1 and p ≥ 0 (which is a shorthand for p k ≥ 0 for all k). Conversely, any such p defines a unique distribution K.
Assume now that K is a perfect encryption distribution for E. This adds several more constraints on p. Specifically, a necessary and sufficient condition for a perfect encryption distribution is to require that for all c ∈ C and all m > 1, we have
We can translate this into a linear equation by noticing that the left probability is equal to {(c 1 .
. Thus, Equation (9) can be rewritten as
We can then rewrite all these constraints on p into a more compact notation by defining a constraint matrix V = {v i,j }, which has (1+(B −1)S) rows (corresponding to the constraints) and N columns (corresponding to keys). The first row of V will consist of all 1's: v 1,k = 1 for all k ∈ K. This will later correspond to the fact that p k = 1. To define the rest of V , which would correspond to (B − 1)S constraints from Equation (10), we first make our notation more suggestive. We index the N columns of V by tuples  (c 1 , . . . c B ) , and the remaining (B − 1)S rows of V by tuples (m, c), where m ∈ {2, . . . B} and c ∈ {1 . . . S}. Then, we define
Now, Equation (10) simply becomes k v (m,c),k · p k = 0. Finally, we define a (1 + (B − 1)S)-column vector e by e 1 = 1 and e i = 0 for i > 1. Combining all this notation, we finally get Lemma 4 An N -dimensional real vector p defines a perfect distribution K for E if and only if V p = e and p ≥ 0.
Using the Lack of 0-Monochromatic Distributions
Next, we use Lemma 4 to understand our assumption that no perfect distribution K is 0-monochromatic with respect to Ext. Before that, we remind the reader of a well known Farkas Lemma (e.g., see [Str80] ):
Farkas Lemma. For any matrix A and column vector e, the linear system Ax = e has no solution x ≥ 0 if and only if there exists a row vector y s.t. yA ≥ 0 and ye < 0. Now, let Z = {k | Ext(k) = 0} be the set of "0-keys" under Ext, and let A denote (1 + (B − 1)S) × |Z|-matrix equal to the constraint matrix V restricted its |Z| columns in Z. Take any real vector p such that p k = 0 for all k ∈ Z. By Lemma 4, p corresponds to a (necessarily 0-monochromatic) perfect distribution K if and only if V p = e and p ≥ 0. But since p k = 0 for all k ∈ Z, the above conditions are equivalent to saying that the |Z|-dimensional restriction x = p| Z of p to its coordinates in Z satisfies Ax = e and x ≥ 0. Conversely, any x satisfying the above constraints defines a 0-monochromatic perfect distribution p by letting p| Z = x and p k = 0 for k ∈ Z.
Thus, Ext defines no 0-monochromatic perfect distributions if and only if the constraints Ax = e and x ≥ 0 are unsatisfiable. But this is exactly the precondition to the Farkas' Lemma above! Using the Farkas Lemma on our A and e, we get the existence of the (1 + (B − 1)S)-dimensional row vector y such that yA ≥ 0 and ye < 0. Just like we did for the rows of V , we denote the first element of y by y 1 , and use the notation y (m,c) to denote the remaining elements of y. We now translate the constraints yA ≥ 0 and ye < 0 using our specific choices of A and e.
Notice, since e 1 = 1 and e i = 0 for i > 1, it means that ye = y 1 , so the constraint that ye < 0 is equivalent to y 1 < 0. Next, recalling that A is just the restriction of V to its columns in Z, and that the first row of V is the all-1 vector, we get that yA ≥ 0 is equivalent to saying that for all (c 1 , . . 
then Ext(k) = 1.
Proof: Summing Equation (14) for all m > 1 we get a contradiction to Equation (13), which means that Ext(k) = 0; i.e., Ext(k) = 1.
Developing Intuition: Special Case b = 1
To get some intuition, we take a momentary detour and consider the special case b = 1, therefore reproving the result of [DS02] . Theorem 2 tells us that if Ext cannot be fixed to 0, there exists real numbers y 1 . . . y S such that y i ≤ y j implies that the key k = (i, j) gets mapped to 1 by Ext. Thus, by rearranging the y's in the non-decreasing order y 1 ≤ y 2 ≤ . . . ≤ y S , we get that Ext((i, j)) = 1 for any i < j. In particular, the uniform distribution on S keys {(1, 2), (2, 3), . . . , (S − 1, S), (S, 1)} is easily seen to define a perfect encryption distribution K (as both Enc(K, 1) and Enc(K, 2) sample a uniformly random ciphertext) at most one of whose components -the key (S, 1) -could conceivably get mapped to 0 by Ext. Thus, Pr[Ext(K) = 0] ≤ 1/S, showing (even stronger) Equation (8) and thus completing this special case. Interestingly, Dodis and Spencer [DS02] used a simpler "graph-theoretic" method to show the existence of exactly the same perfect distribution K as above. They viewed ciphertexts as vertices of the complete directed graph G on S vertices, and keys k = (c 1 , c 2 ) (where c 1 = c 2 ) -as directed edges connecting c 1 = Enc(k, 1) to c 2 = Enc(k, 2). With this notation, it is easy to see that a uniform distribution on any cycle in this graph defines a perfect encryption distribution. Now, considering first 2-cycles {(c 1 , c 2 ), (c 2 , c 1 )}, the fact that none of them is 0-monochromatic implies that at least one of Ext((c 1 , c 2 )) = 1 or Ext((c 2 , c 1 )) = 1 is true, for any c 1 = c 2 . Taking one such edge from every 2-cycle yields what is called a tournament graph, every one of whose edges extracts to 1. Now, a well known (and simple to prove) result in graph theory states that every tournament graph has a Hamiltonian path. In other words, there exists an ordering of ciphertexts c 1 . . . c S such that every edge (c i , c j ) belongs to the 1-monochromatic tournament subgraph whenever i < j; i.e., Ext((c i , c j )) = 1 if i < j. Completing this Hamiltonian path to a Hamiltonian cycle (by adding the edge (c S , c 1 )) yields the same kind of perfect distribution K we built earlier using Theorem 2.
Unfortunately, it seems hard to extend this graph-theoretic argument to "hypergraphs" corresponding to b > 1. Instead, we chose to rely on linear algebra (i.e., Theorem 2) to get a better handle on the problem. Still, our proof below for general b > 1 is quite more involved than the proof above for b = 1.
Building Non-Extractable yet Perfect K
Returning to the general case, we build a special perfect distribution K which contains many keys satisfying Equation (14), meaning that Ext(K) is very biased towards 1. We will construct such K having a very special form below. The reason for this terminology is the following. Given any B-valid π 1 , . . . , π B , where recall that B = |M|, we can define S valid keys k 1 , . . . , k S ∈ K by k c = (π 1 (c), . . . , π B (c)), where the B-validity constraint precisely ensures that all the B ciphertexts inside k c are distinct, so that k c is a legal key in K. Now, we denote by K (π 1 ,...,π B ) the uniform distribution over these S keys k 1 , . . . , k S .
Proof: For any message m, Enc (K (π 1 ,...,π B ) , m) is equivalent to outputting π m (U C ), where U C is the uniform distribution over C. Since each π m is a permutation over C, this is equivalent to U C . Thus, encryption of every message m yields a truly random ciphertext c ∈ C, which means that K (π 1 ,...,π B ) is perfect.
Choosing Good Permutations. We will construct our perfect distribution K = K (π 1 ,...,π B ) by carefully choosing a B-valid family (π 1 , . . . , π B ) such that Ext(K) is very biased towards 1. We start by choosing π 1 to be the identity permutation π 1 (c) = c (for all c), and proceed by defining π 2 . . . π B iteratively. After defining each π d , we will maintain the following invariants which clearly hold for the base case d = 1: Now, assuming inductively that we have defined π 1 = id, π 2 , . . . , π d which satisfy properties (i) and (ii) above, we will construct π d+1 still satisfying (i) and (ii). This inductive step is somewhat technical, and we will come back to it in the next subsections. But first, assuming it is true, we show that we can easily finish our proof. Indeed, we apply the induction for B − 1 iterations and get B permutations π 1 , . . . , π B satisfying properties (i) and (ii) above. Then, property (i) and Lemma 5 imply that K (π 1 ,...,π B ) is a perfect encryption distribution. On the other hand, property (ii) and the definition of k c = {c, π 2 (c), . . . , π B (c)} imply that any key k c ∈ T B satisfies Equation (14). Thus, by Theorem 2 we get that Ext(k c ) = 1 for every c ∈ T B . Since, |T B | > S − B 2 , we get that at most B 2 out of S keys k c extract to 0. Thus, since K (π 1 ,...,π B ) is uniform over its S keys, we get
which shows Equation (8) and completes our proof (modulo the inductive step).
Preparing for Induction: Detour to Matchings
Before doing the inductive step, we recall some basic facts about bipartite graphs, which we will need soon. A (balanced) bipartite graph G is given by two vertex sets L and R of cardinality S and an edge set
In this case every i ∈ L is matched to a unique j ∈ R and vice versa. We say that a subset L ′ ⊆ L is matchable (in G) if there exists a matching P containing L ′ as the set of its endpoints in L. In this case we also say that L ′ is matchable with R ′ , where R ′ ⊆ R is the set of P 's endpoints in R. (Put differently, L ′ is matchable with R ′ precisely when the subgraph induced by L ′ and R ′ contains a perfect matching.) The famous Hall's marriage theorem gives a necessary and sufficient condition for L ′ to be matchable.
Hall's Marriage Theorem. L ′ is matchable if and only if every subset
We will only use the following two special cases of Hall's theorem. 
Finishing the Proof
Finally, we can collect all the pieces together and define a good matching P in G (corresponding to π d+1 ).
With an eye on satisfying property (ii), we start with a large (but not yet perfect) matching P ′ of G ′ of size at least S − d, guaranteed by Lemma 9. Ideally, we would like to extend P ′ to some perfect matching in the full graph G, by somehow matching the vertices currently unmatched by P ′ . Unfortunately, we do not know how to argue that such extension is possible, since there are at most d vertices unmatched, and we can only match arbitrary sets of size at least 2d by Lemma 8. So we simply take an arbitrary sub-matching P ′′ of P ′ of size S − 2d, just throwing away any |P ′ | − (S − 2d) edges of P ′ . Notice, P ′′ is also a matching of G which has exactly 2d unmatched vertices on both sides. By Lemma 8, we know that we can always match these missing vertices, and get a perfect matching P of the entire G. We finally claim that this perfect matching P defines a permutation π d+1 on C satisfying properties (i) and (ii).
Property (i) is immediate since P is a perfect matching of G. As for property (ii), let L ′ denote the S − 2d endpoints of P ′′ in L. Now, every c ∈ L ′ satisfies Equation (16) , since this is how the graph G ′ was defined and (c, π d+1 (c)) ∈ P ′′ ⊆ E(G ′ ). Thus, we can inductively define T d+1 = T d ∩ L ′ and have T d+1 satisfy property (ii). We only need to argue that T d+1 is large enough, but this is easy. Since L ′ misses only 2d ciphertexts, we get by induction that
completing the induction and the whole proof.
Conclusions and Open Problems
We study the question of whether true randomness is inherent for achieving privacy, and show a largely positive answer for the case of information-theoretic private-key encryption, as well as computationally secure perfectly-binding primitives. The most interesting question is to study other privacy primitives (either information-theoretic or computational) not immediately covered by our technique. For example, what about 2-out-2 secret sharing (which is strictly implied by private-key encryption [DPP06] ) or computationally binding commitment schemes? Do they still require true randomness? More generally, we hope that our result and techniques will stimulate further interest in understanding the extent to which cryptographic primitives can be based on imperfect randomness.
